Introduction
Chapter VI of the United Nations has stood the test of time as a preserver of peace amidst various International crises and conflicts resulting in the ravagement of land, properties, trade and an upscale of violations of human rights. It embodies the principles and mechanisms that promote the peaceful settlement of disputes between parties across the globe. The chapter comprising Articles 33-38 stands on the principle laid down in Article 2(3) of the UN charter which states, “Every Member shall resolve their international disputes amicably so as not to jeopardise international justice, security, or peace.”
The Security Council has been given competency over situations or disputes arising from state parties to settle it through pacific methods(i.e., enshrined under Article 33(1),35 and 36) to promote international peace to prevent Armed Conflict, promote diplomacy & dialogue and advocate for multilateralism. The aim of this piece is to evaluate how Chapter VI’s provisions are applied to real-world disputes and to underscore the significant authority granted to the Security Council within this framework.
The Pacifist Approach in the Violence Driven Field
The Prime Principle that has upheld and uplifted Chapter VI of the UN Charter is enshrined in Article 33(1), which states that the parties to any dispute may first seek a solution through processes such as negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, and resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their choice. This should be read in conjunction with its second clause and Article 36(2), which grants the UNSC the power to call upon the parties to resolve their dispute using the same methods. It can be inferred that the article’s primary objective is to facilitate conflict resolution through peaceful means thus helping states in addressing their contemporary disputes.The Colombian Peace Agreement (2016) between the Colombian government and the Revolutionary armed forces of Colombia serves as an example of the Pacific way of Negotiation and Mediation in accordance with Article 33(1). The UN mediators initiated the peace talks in Cuba by providing a neutral platform to both parties, thus giving prominence to the Negotiations resulting in a Peace agreement. The famous, Joint comprehensive Plan of Action also known as the Iran Nuclear Deal that concluded in 2015 between P5+1(Germany) and Iran through Negotiations is yet another significant and remarkable illustration of the aforementioned provision as it granted authority to the International Atomic Energy Agency to monitor and verify Iran’s compliance with its Nuclear related commitments and further to limit Iran up to 15 years from enrichment of Uranium only up to 3.67%. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) rendered an award in 2012 supporting Colombia’s territorial sovereignty over the disputed area, although the dispute later escalated. Following the award, both parties made diplomatic efforts to put the court’s ruling into effect. This judicial settlement was applied in the Nicaragua and Colombia Maritime Boundary Dispute.
Last but not least, the arbitration is prominently under the Jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of Arbitration which has arbitrated the dispute of the Iron Rhine Railway dispute between Belgium and the Netherlands. This exemplifies the robust Provision of Article 33 by contributing to International Stability in a sensitive phase of Geo-Politics
Unveiling the Authority of the UN Nations Security Council
The United Nations Security Council, which has the authority to order and bestow various responsibilities/procedures to settle disputes between countries under Articles 33(2), 34, 35(1), 35(2), 36, and 37, is the key player in executing the provisions of Chapter VI of the UN charter. The most sweeping authority conferred to the SC under Chapter VI is the ability to interfere in the substance of a dispute. The SC is the only body with the authority to interact with the parties because of its ability to delve into the details of disputes. As part of its authority to issue substantive recommendations, the SC may advise the parties to adhere to provisional measures if they are deemed necessary to prevent the escalation of the dispute. There are two reasons that support the SC’s ability to consider a dispute’s content. First, it is contended that simply suggesting adjustment methods once more would be meaningless when the parties to a dispute have already exhausted peaceful means of resolution . Second, given that the dispute has been submitted to the SC with the consent of all parties, the SC enjoys a wider scope of powers and is therefore capable of delving into the substance of the dispute, as demonstrated by the Kosova Conflict (1999) and the Syrian Civil War (2011).
The Authority of SC is closely tied with the Provision of Article 35 that derived its enforceability from Article 34 and is mainly read conjointly. Thus, Article 34 states that “The SC is authorised to look into disputes/situations that may endanger global peace and security so that it may take appropriate measures to prevent the conflict from escalating further.”Article 35 evaluates any UN member state to bring any dispute or any situation with the same nature as of Article 34 to the Security Council or General Assembly. The Russia-Ukraine Conflict (2022) and the Myanmar coup d’état (2021) are two of the major and recent illustrations where the provisions were exercised. In line with the former conflict , the United States and Albania presented Resolution 2623 (2022) to the UN Security Council in compliance with Article 35(1). The resolution calls for emergency extraordinary sessions (ES-11/1 to 11/6). Another instance is the current crisis in Myanmar, where the collapse of the military resulted in increased abuses of human rights, the arrest of important figures, murders, and a rise in violence throughout the nation. The Security Council passed Resolution 2669 after member states brought attention to Myanmar’s internal unrest. The Resolutions were adopted after the investigation was conducted in compliance with Article 34. Although both the resolutions could not seek the implementation of their objective as Resolution 2623 was vetoed and Resolution 2669 was not complied with yet still this exemplifies the relevance of these legal texts in a skirmish-driven world.
Regarding the authority granted to the Security Council, Article 37 aims to create a real duty on the part of the disputing parties to bring the issue before the Security Council, as opposed to only giving them a choice for resolving their differences. Article 37 gives the SC the power to either conduct Article 36’s directives or offer significant suggestions on the terms of a settlement and may “recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment” in relation to Article 36. The UN Charter’s Article 36 states that the Security Council shall conduct its functions in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations. Article 37 of the UN Charter gives the Security Council the authority to take action to maintain or restore international peace and security. The Security Council authorised member nations to offer South Korea military support in fending off the invasion by authorising the evacuation of North Korean forces from the country through Resolution 82. Article 37 of the UN Charter justifies the involvement of UN forces, which are mainly headed by the US but also include soldiers from other member states, as a means of restoring regional international peace and security. The war continued until 1953 when an armistice was negotiated to put an end to it. Since a peace treaty was never signed, the two Koreas are still formally at war. Another Prominent instance was Iraq – invasion of Kuwait in 1990 where the Security Council involvement was done to restore regional international peace and security. The Rearmost Article under Chapter VI is Article 38 which gives the Security Council the power to advise parties to a dispute provided they all agree to try to resolve it amicably.
Demerits in the Process
The process of the pacific settlement of disputes involving superpower nations within the Security Council has inherent flaws, primarily due to the veto power granted to its five permanent members (P5). This veto authority has long been a structural shortcoming, undermining the Council’s ability to resolve disputes impartially and effectively. The Cold War period provides a clear example of this issue. In October 1956, Hungarian students marched in solidarity with Polish demonstrators, demanding political reforms in Soviet-controlled Hungary. When Soviet forces entered Budapest, claiming they were invited to restore order, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States submitted a joint request to the Security Council to address the foreign military intervention and the suppression of the Hungarian people’s rights. However, the Security Council’s ability to take decisive action was stifled due to the Soviet Union’s use of its veto, showcasing how the veto power can paralyse the Council’s mandate to maintain international peace and security.
This problem continues to persist. For example, Russia vetoed Resolution 2623 in 2022, which aimed to address the Russia-Ukraine conflict, citing Ukraine’s alliance with the United States. Similarly, in March 2024, both Russia and China vetoed a U.S.-led resolution on a ceasefire in Gaza, arguing that the resolution’s language was ambiguous and failed to address the core interests of the conflict. These recent instances demonstrate that the veto power remains a significant impediment to the Security Council’s ability to act decisively, especially when the interests of the P5 members are at stake. Consequently, the veto mechanism continues to hinder the Council’s capacity to achieve its primary goal of ensuring global peace and security in conflicts involving superpowers or their allies.
Another major demerit is Chapter VI is recommendatory in nature, the Security Council’s authority under it is not legally binding in the same sense as Chapter VII, which addresses enforcement measures like military intervention or sanctions. Alternatively, the Council may make suggestions meant to assist parties in resolving their disagreements without using force. In the Namibia Advisory Opinion (1971) the ICJ advisory opinion on certain UN matters, the ICJ has consistently held that the Security Council’s decisions under Chapter VI are not binding but merely recommendatory. This discrepancy has been highlighted in the Security Council’s engagement in the Kashmir dispute, specifically via Resolution 47 (1948), is a prime example of Chapter VI’s advisory character. The resolution called for plebiscites and ceasefires, among other nonviolent measures, but it was unenforceable, and its suggestions were never carried out in full.
Conclusion
Chapter VI of the charter has over time stood as a beacon for hope in the world. Still, it has its own discrepancies in the form of effective implementation and taking robust decisions on sensitive disputes that require urgent action from the UN. However, the Security Council’s proposal to parties engaged in a dispute based on human rights to resolve it has a unique quality. The non-binding nature of any report that may be produced at the conclusion of the process sets Articles 33 to 38 of the UN Charter apart from other articles. Countries would be better off using the strategies described in them than letting disagreements turn into full-fledged hostilities or wars. Delegating the Member States, the last say in interpretation would leave a gap and significantly reduce the UN’s, particularly the SC’s, effectiveness. By contesting the relevant action on the grounds that it is outside the SC’s authority, any Member State of the UN could easily obstruct or impair the SC’s ability to carry out its tasks. The UN system can become unstable as a result. In addition, because of the possibility of future challenges to the legal legitimacy of the SC’s rulings, other subjects of international law can have mixed feelings about following its rulings. A limited perspective on the Member States’ authority to offer genuine interpretations is required due to the requirement for legal certainty.
Thus, In order to rejuvenate Chapter VI of the UN charter, the recommendatory nature of it should be transformed into binding nature in order to keep its unique mechanism of Pacific settlement enshrined in the present world to uphold and regulate peace.
Ali Johar is a third year law student at Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi.
Picture Credit: UN Organization
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