Introduction
Iran hosts one of the world’s largest refugee populations-the Afghans. It is a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention (“Convention”) and since the opening up of their borders to Afghan refugees, has always portrayed itself as a “brother” to the Afghans. However, with the change in economic and social conditions in the country, the refugee population that was once a symbol of brotherhood and solidarity, often used to further state interests, was labelled as a security threat that threatened the economic and social fabric of the nation. Mass deportations, constant surveillance, and violence towards Afghan refugees became a common occurrence. Moreover, the very framework that was supposed to recognize and help them integrate into the society, was used to conceal mistreatment, tighten control, and facilitate constant surveillance of the vulnerable.
This piece examines the Iranian refugee framework as of 2025. It contends that despite Iran’s ratification of the Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (“Protocol”), it actively uses its domestic legal framework to violate principles of international refugee law, which has particularly adverse consequences for Afghan refugees. Firstly, the piece highlights the current state of Afghan refugees in Iran, demonstrating how Iran is actively flouting international law principles and going against the very Convention they ratified. Secondly, it attempts to highlight the inherent tension between refugee law and politics, suggesting that the solution to the problem of economic instability and social integration in Iran lies in the acceptance of the refugees itself. Finally, it provides a two-pronged approach which attempts to balance Iran’s interests with that of its obligations towards Afghan refugees.
Current State of the Refugees and the Violation of the Refugee Convention
A review of the evolution of Iran’s stance towards Afghan refugees makes it evident that there has been a significant change in the country’s refugee framework. More than four hundred ten thousand refugees and migrants have been deported since the conclusion of the twelve-day war with Israel in June 2025. In total, more than one million refugees have been pushed out of the country in 2025, which is an unprecedented level of returns. The Afghan refugees, once a symbol of solidarity, and the backbone of Iran’s labor force, were now elements of threat. Local media, politicians, and the Iranian population began treating them as terrorists and criminals, often being enabled by the people in power. This is supplemented by the accounts of Afghan migrants being beaten and humiliated by security forces, with some of them being abruptly deported. The legality of their stay in the country did not matter, for there are accounts of legal documents of Afghans being shredded by the Iranian police.
The deportation of Afghans to their country of origin, especially in the aftermath of the Taliban’s takeover, violates the principle of non-refoulement under Article 33 of the Convention. The Convention forbids return and non-admittance of refugees at the border when there are reasonable grounds for believing that the refugee would be at risk of irreparable harm upon return to their country of origin. While Iran claims that a part of the population is voluntarily leaving the country, its claims raise suspicion given the lack of sufficient data as well as Afghan accounts of their treatment in Iran. Among the core components of voluntary repatriation are physical, legal, and material safety. Ebbing of violence and non-discriminatory access to services are, therefore, sine qua non for voluntary repatriation. In the current case, the influx of Afghan refugees in Iran spiked during the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan in 2021, a situation which still persists in the country.
Additionally, UNHCR reports that over 70% of Afghan returnees from Iran were forcibly expelled- many of them women and children. The deportation of refugees is extremely dangerous for women and girl children, given the record of gender-based persecution and human rights violations that are prevalent in Afghanistan under the Taliban rule. Therefore, Iran’s characterisation of sending back Afghans as “voluntary” is not merely factually dubious but also legally irrelevant where the conditions in the country of origin negate the possibility of informed, uncoerced choice.
The principle of non-refoulement can only be set aside if there are reasonable grounds for considering the refugee a danger to the security of the country they reside in. The Convention does not require strict evidence for considering a refugee as a danger to national security. If an individual has been previously convicted of a serious crime, he can be understood to constitute a danger to the community of Iran. However, even if the exception to the principle of non-refoulement is triggered, it has been held by the court in Manickavasagam Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) that refoulement can only occur if a substantial risk to the national security of the state was proven. This moves beyond simply suspecting that an individual, by way of his ethnicity, is a threat to the nation. The state must produce proof of such doubts and must follow the legal process rather than resorting to immediate deportation of such individuals. By requiring demonstrable and substantial risk rather than mere reliance on broad or unsubstantiated suspicions, the court strengthened due process and upheld the need for individual assessment. Moreover, it narrowed the scope for arbitrary deportations and ensured protection of refugees by preventing deportations based on arbitrary standards.
Despite clear judicial guidance on evidentiary thresholds, the Convention lacks a definition of “reasonable grounds” in provisions governing non-refoulement exceptions. This textual ambiguity severely undermines refugee protection, even with judgments and UNHCR directives clarifying its scope. It permits restrictive state interpretations that can justify deportations while remaining formally consistent with the text of the Convention. This has adverse consequences on the rights of the refugees because it enables Iran to engage in deportations at the unprecedented levels that it is doing right now, simply by stating that it has reasonable grounds to believe that they are serious criminals, with no adequate data, statistics or grounds to prove the same.
Additionally, mass deportations also affect refugees who continue to stay within the country. They cast them as wrongdoers and criminals, reinforcing xenophobic attitudes and further undermining their prospects for successful integration within the host country. Iran currently demonstrates a similar circular pattern. It utilizes deportation as a policy instrument to relieve itself of the economic burden associated with hosting a large refugee population. However, a consequence of this deportation is the growing Afghanophobia and stereotyping of Afghan refugees in Iran which makes it difficult for those residing in the country to successfully integrate within its culture and contribute towards ameliorating economic conditions.
While most Afghans are being unfairly deported from the country, those remaining are also subjected to control, surveillance, and mistreatment by the Government. Afghan refugees have faced increased movement restrictions, and prohibition on residency has become stricter. Afghan migrants are not allowed to reside in nineteen Iranian provinces. Additionally, most second and third generation Afghans, despite being fluent in Persian and raised in Iran itself, are still denied citizenship, legal jobs, and access to banking services. To give this unjust framework some legitimacy, the regime introduced new regulations imposing fines on employers of undocumented Afghans, criminalizing visa overstays beyond six months, and restricting legal residency to six narrow categories. This was not an attempt to balance state interests with its obligations towards refugees- it was an attempt to conceal deeper injustice.
A question inevitably arises upon observing the situation in Iran: what led to this shift? What prompted this unprecedented treatment of Afghan refugees in the country? The answer to this question lies in economic instability. After decades of economic mismanagement and international sanctions, Afghan refugees are now seen as a liability. The hate and terror inflicted upon the refugee population is an attempt by the regime to conceal its own failures of economic collapse, political disarray and rising unrest. However, what Iran actively overlooks is the contribution that Afghans make to their economy. The refugee population acts as an agent of economic stability and prosperity and is engaged in professions such as livestock farming and tile work, as well as construction work in urban areas. Additionally, the Afghan workforce has been documented to demonstrate higher efficiency and productivity than the local workforce.
The contradiction at the heart of Iran’s refugee policy is unmistakable. Afghans in the country are relied upon for their labor while simultaneously being constructed as an economic burden, rendering them disposable in law yet very integral to the economy in practice. This disjuncture reveals that the crisis is not only a humanitarian one, but also legal and political. It raises the question of whether international refugee obligations, particularly of developing nations that face economic turmoil, can survive when they collide with the state’s perceived economic and security interests. It is this tension, exposed through Iran’s treatment of the refugees within its borders, that Part II of this piece proceeds to examine and reconcile.
Click here to read part II.
Anushka Mahapatra is a third-year law student at the National Law School of India University, Bangalore.
Picture Credit: UNHCR/Sebastian Rich
Jindal Forum for International and Economic Laws 