Part I of this piece examined the current state of Afghan refugees in Iran, highlighting how, despite ratification of the Refugee Convention, Iran subjects its refugee population to structural violence, non-consensual deportation, and uses them as political tools to subvert accountability. Building on this analysis, this part examines the inherent tension between state interest and its obligation towards refugees under the Convention. It explores key legal principles, accountability mechanisms, and enforcement strategies to ensure that developing nations are effectively and substantially able to adhere to their ratification of the Convention whilst ensuring that their own citizens are not threatened by, or will suffer because of refugee integration within the country.
Can State Interests be Reconciled with Obligation towards Refugees?
While Iran’s actions are deplorable, what lies at the heart of it is the constant tension between the interests of the state and its citizens, and the obligation that it has under customary international law as well international refugee law. The key question, therefore, is whether such a conflict can be reconciled so as to serve the interests of the state as well as to accord adequate and effective protection to Afghan refugees.
Obligations of Iran under the Convention and Why It Struggles to Meet Them
Iran acceded to the Convention along with the Protocol with reservations to Article 17 (wage-earning employment), Article 23 (public relief), Article 24 (labour legislation and social security), and Article 26 (freedom of movement). These reservations reflect the intention to limit socio-economic integration of refugees, thereby going against the very essence of the Convention itself. Disregard for Article 17, for instance, prevents refugees from securing lawful and adequately remunerated employment, making it difficult for them to climb up the income ladder. This, as discussed earlier, hampers rather than boosts Iran’s economy. Similarly, restrictions on welfare schemes and freedom of movement further constrain refugees’ ability to relocate for employment and education to regions which are better placed to handle their influx. Such limitations are not merely administrative decisions. They raise concerns about the extent to which Iran meets the standard under the Convention and the accompanying Protocol.
Despite having certain reservations to the Convention, Iran has assumed an obligation to protect refugees within its borders. Under the Convention, it must allow individuals to apply for asylum and ensure that they are treated with dignity and no discrimination. Additionally, the principle of non-refoulement binds the country to refrain from deporting refugees and ensuring that even those departures that may appear “voluntary” are not influenced by threat or coercion given the economic, social and political scenario in the country. Iran’s reservations to certain provisions of the Convention, despite them relating to core refugee rights, do not permit derogation from the principle of non-refoulement which continues to bind the State under both the Convention as well as customary international law. Its current conduct towards the Afghan refugees is not only in breach of the principle of non-refoulement, but it also deprives refugees of basic human rights enshrined within the Universal Declaration of Human Rights such as the right to basic education and to not be discriminated against.
Most developing countries struggle to meet their obligations under the Convention. This is because the Convention was initially limited to European refugees and, therefore, is hardly the best instrument to deal with situations of mass influx. With Iran hosting one of the largest refugee populations in the world, the Convention’s universal refugee protection mandate would falter in a developing country that is itself starved of economic opportunities, resources and growth. Moreover, given Iran’s security tensions with its neighboring states, its national interests often take precedence over its obligation towards refugees. Therefore, the crucial question of reconciliation requires a region-specific approach to the successful integration of refugees within the economic and cultural fabric of the country, while at the same time looking for ways to curb mass influxes, and protect Iran from genuine security concerns. This will be explored in the following subsection.
How can the tension be reconciled?
The Convention, in its preamble, perfectly encapsulates the aim of its enforcement. It seeks to assure refugees the widest exercise of their fundamental rights and freedoms, to improve international cooperation, and to recognize the social and humanitarian nature of the problems faced by refugees. Iran’s Amayesh registration system and subsequent resolutions reduce Afghan refugees to statistics rather than treating their protection as a humanitarian necessity. They are treated as political tools rather than individuals that have the right to live with dignity and normalcy. Therefore, to adhere to the essence of the Convention whilst ensuring that state interests are sufficiently protected, the piece suggests a two-pronged approach.
Firstly, there needs to be a shift in the government’s approach from that of control to integration of Afghan refugees. Undocumented Afghans must be given some form of temporary refugee status, in conformity with the Convention, along with protection of the refugees already present in the country. This would acknowledge their role in the economy and provide them opportunities to upskill through schools and universities, enabling them to become more productive members of society. While Iran views Afghan refugees as a burden to their economy, they are actually instrumental in advancing the economy, particularly in times of war, political instability and international sanctions.
Additionally, moving up the income brackets would allow them to contribute more towards the country’s taxation, boosting government revenue and allowing the Iranian government to direct that revenue towards the welfare of the nation. Such an approach simultaneously mitigates economic instability and allows refugees to live with honour. Evidence from Colombia demonstrates the effectiveness of the model. Issuance of temporary special stay permits to both regular and irregular migrants led to measurable improvements in the well-being of the Venezuelans in the country, contributing to better working conditions, and expanding access to public services for the refugee population. Furthermore, the Temporary Protection Statute for Venezuelan Migrants grants Venezuelans access to services, including health, education, and employment, while also establishing a pathway to permanent residence. The introduction of this framework has facilitated the regularization of around 1.8 million Venezuelan refugees and migrants as of 2022, while doubling tax returns for the country to benefit as well.
Secondly, coming to the social aspect of the problem, legislation is necessary to prevent arbitrary deportations. For a developing country like Iran, which is plagued by scarcity of resources and high security concerns, expecting a universal rights-based approach to refugee acceptance would be unpragmatic and extremely detrimental to the country. In cases where there is genuine reasonable doubt that threatens the security of the country, Iran should pursue safe repatriation with the help of civil societies and the UNHCR to countries that can better accommodate Afghan refugees.
The larger goal of Iran in this context should be towards long-term resettlement, provision of education, healthcare, and work opportunities for the Afghans as well as to better equip itself for sudden influxes of refugees in the future. None of this would be possible with the growing xenophobia and hatred against Afghans, which actively puts the refugees at risk, often subjecting them to inhumane treatment. Community-based integration programmes, therefore, become crucial to sensitize the local population and to refute unproven and discriminatory allegations against the Afghan refugee population at large. Mass deportations without adherence to due process of the law must be halted immediately and instead, Iran must attempt to strengthen networks with neighboring countries to shift refugees if the influx causes a strain on the country’s economy. Drawing on Uganda’s 2006 National Refugees Act and the subsequent 2010 Refugee Regulations, Iran’s refugee framework requires substantive reform in two principal areas. Firstly, the legislation must formally adopt an open-door policy grounded in the principle of non-refoulement, thereby ensuring that Afghan refugees are neither denied entry, nor are they coerced into “voluntary” repatriation.
Secondly, Iran’s current restrictions on Afghan refugees’ right to access social services and the right to documentation should be lifted to facilitate self-reliance rather than prolonged dependency. Furthermore, Iran must adopt a humanitarian approach that considers both refugees and host communities, ensuring that support for the Afghans does not come at the perceived expense of the local population. This balance can be operationalized through coordinated efforts of development actors and state institutions, preventing the local population from bearing the burden for hosting refugees. It is necessary to recognize Iran’s structural limitations as a developing state to sustain itself during significant economic turmoil. Therefore, the burden of sustaining and hosting large-scale refugee influxes should not rest on the country alone. The UNHCR, as it had contributed in Colombia and Uganda, can be pivotal in working alongside the Iranian government to draft a comprehensive legislation that simultaneously upholds refugee rights and safeguards state interests.
Conclusion
Iran’s treatment of Afghan refugees is a painful demonstration of humanitarian failure. It is in gross violation of one of the most fundamental principles of international law. The politicization of a vulnerable refugee population to serve the State’s purpose is a display of power and repression where dignity is compromised in an effort to redirect accountability from the regime’s failure to maintain the socioeconomic stability, to a manufactured image of a particular section of the refugee population as threats to the country.
It is important for the state to balance the interests of its citizens with its obligations towards the refugees and migrants residing within its borders. This careful balance should involve economic, social, and cultural integration of the refugee population into the fabric of the country. Iran should acknowledge and use the contribution of the Afghan refugee population to the Iranian economy and social life. While such an integration has its own challenges, as with a lot of developing countries accepting refugees, it is important to acknowledge that where it is logistically difficult for refugees to travel to the nearest developed country, especially in situations involving widespread persecution and toppling of regimes, the UNHCR, civil societies, and the developing country must work together to find sustainable solutions to advancing state interests along with the interests of the refugees- and not at the expense of them.
Click here to read part I.
Anushka Mahapatra is a third-year law student at the National Law School of India University, Bangalore.
Picture Credit: UNHCR/Sebastian Rich
Jindal Forum for International and Economic Laws 